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UNITED NATIONS ARMS TRADE TREATY: RUSSIA’S JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR ABSTENTION AND THE TREATY’S EFFECTIVENESS IN APPLICATION
Joshua D. Sorensen*

Abstract
Over the last two decades, many States have recognized the need for
a multi-lateral treaty regulating weapons that are used all over the world
to commit genocides and other atrocities. The United Nations (UN) Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) was passed on April 2, 2013, and came into effect on
December 24, 2014, as an attempt to address this problem. However,
after a nearly universal acceptance of the need for such a treaty, Russia,
along with many other key States, has abstained from joining the ATT.
While Russia did not object outright to an arms trade treaty, Russia does
not have any clear intent to join the current ATT. Russia has listed
several reasons for its abstention including: the non-binding nature of
the treaty, the treaty’s failure to address transfers to private parties, the
treaty’s low standards, and its potentially discriminatory effect against
Russia.
This Comment considers the validity of Russia’s justifications for
abstention and the effectiveness of the ATT without Russia and other key
States being parties to the treaty. Russia’s abstention raises serious
questions as to the ATT’s effectiveness. Russia is the second largest arms
distributor in the world and is more than capable of arming States that
would otherwise be barred under the ATT. Additionally, since transfers
to private parties remain unregulated and because much of the treaty’s
terms are mere recommendations, it is likely the ATT is nothing more
than a superficial attempt to remedy a deep problem. However, while the
ATT may seem to be weak, it is still a step in the right direction.

* Juris Doctor, December 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Provo, UT.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The world has a problem: arms have been and are still used to
commit genocides and other atrocities on nearly a daily basis,1 and small
or conventional arms cause approximately ninety percent of these
atrocities. 2 A half a million civilians or more are killed annually in
conflicts using conventional arms,3 and there are “two bullets” produced
for every person on this planet.4 The transfer of arms continues to ignite
differences into full-fledged armed conflict, which allows major arms
exporters “to profit from the misery of others.”5 The question remains
whether the global community can effectively band together to solve this
problem.
The United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was passed in
an effort to reduce arms from ending up in the hands of those who will
use them to commit such atrocities.6 The ATT is “for the purpose of:
contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
reducing human suffering; [and] promoting cooperation, transparency
and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in
conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.”7
The ATT has been described as “the most important [treaty] in the
history of the United Nations in the field of conventional arms control
standards.”8 But is the ATT really the solution? UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon opened the 2012 General Assembly stating, “[t]he arms
trade fuels ill-regulated and civil conflicts, destabilizes regions and
expands the capabilities of terrorists and criminal networks. We do not
have a multilateral treaty on global trade in conventional arms. It's a
shame.” 9 The ATT was designed to “prevent and eradicate” this
problem;10 but, will it meet this goal?
Whenever States with principled positions attempt to reach an
agreement, some question arises as to the viability of such an
agreement.11 Not every UN Member State12 has faith in the ATT’s ability
1

See Anup Shah, Arms Trade—A Major Cause of Suffering, GLOBAL ISSUES (June 30, 2013),
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-major-cause-of-suffering.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
Earth has a population of over seven billion people. See Sergei Vasilenkov, UN unable to take
arms under control, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 22, 2013), http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/22-032013/124138-un_arms_control-0/.
5
See Anup Shah, Small Arms—They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan.
21, 2006), http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/small-arms-they-cause-90-of-civilian-casualties.
6
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, available at https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf.
7
Id.
8
Lyuba Lulko, Will There Ever Be Order in International Arms Trade?, PRAVADA.RU (Jun.
07,
2012),
http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/06-07-2012/121571international_arms_trade-0/.
9
Id.
10
See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6.
11
See Vasilenkov, supra note 4.
12
At its founding in 1945, the UN was comprised of 51 original members. Over the years, the
UN’s growth in membership has risen to 193 Member States. See Growth in United Nations
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to effectively address the problem. Russia, one of the world’s largest
dealers in arms,13 believes the ATT is no more than a superficial BandAid on a deep wound.14 And if Russia does not get on board with the
ATT, then how effective can it really be?
Russia’s justifications for abstention from signing on to the ATT
have some merit, as the ATT does not address arms transfers to private
parties. However, Russia’s justifications are also likely, in part, a ploy to
allow Russia to transfer arms to States that might otherwise be prohibited
under the ATT. A nation balancing conflicting interests can be tricky;
such is the situation with Russia, therefore justifying its abstention from
the ATT is complex.
Additionally, the ATT’s effectiveness in accomplishing its intended
purpose is in serious question. First, the ATT fails to specifically address
transfers to non-state actors. Second, it leaves the black market relatively
untouched. Further, the ATT’s goals will, more often than not, be
subjugated to the interest of the parties, resulting in transfers that might
arguably be prohibited under the ATT but are economically or politically
advantageous to the exporting nation. Finally, even if the ATT can draw
more abstainers to support it, certain Member States will remain in
opposition by expressly opposing it or through abstaining to recognize it.
This Comment provides a close look at the ATT and at Russia’s
objections to signing the ATT. This Comment is not an attempt to solve
any specific problems but, rather, an attempt to consider whether
Russia’s concerns are valid or mere political posturing. Part II briefly
reviews the history of the ATT. Part III takes a look at Russia’s specific
justifications for abstention from signing the ATT, then considers the
validity of Russia’s justifications. Part IV contemplates the potential
effectiveness of the ATT when Russia is not a party. Finally, Part V
concludes by questioning the effect of the UN General Assembly’s treaty
process.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF ATT
The ATT is “the first attempt of humanity to control the movement
of the products that kill about 700,000 people a year with 500,000 of
them being civilians.”15 Even though many, if not all, Member States

Membership, 1945 – Present, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last
visited Nov. 18, 2014).
13
See SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (March 17, 2014), http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/AT_march_2014. After
the end of the Cold War, Russia’s arms trade spent a few years in shambles. In recent years, Russia
has been making a strong comeback, usurping first place from the United States in 2013.
14
See UN General Assembly Approves 1st Global Conventional Arms Trade Treaty, THE
VOICE OF RUSSIA (Apr. 3, 2013), http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_04_03/UN-General-Assemblyapproves-1st-global-conventional-arms-trade-treaty/; Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join
– Moscow, RT (Sept. 26, 2013), http://rt.com/politics/arms-russia-trade-join-377/.
15
Lulko, supra note 8.
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have uniformly recognized the need for such a treaty,16 such uniformity
is not present in regards to the treaty’s content.17 A sufficient number of
Member States have, nonetheless, moved forward with the ATT.18
Efforts to curb arms transfers are not new, but many of the efforts
have proved unfruitful.19 Since the early 1900s, the global community
has made efforts to regulate arms transfers but with little avail.20 For
example, in 1925, a draft Convention on the Arms Trade was produced,
but never adopted. 21 Over the next century, major importing and
exporting States consistently opposed such attempts to regulate arms,
seeing the free trade of arms as necessary for developing alliances and
building a strong economy.22
From 2008 to 2012, the top five major exporters of arms in the
world—accounting for approximately seventy-five percent of arms
exports—were the United States of America, Russia, Germany, France,
and China. 23 Not surprisingly, even today, many of the top armsexporting countries have continued to provide opposition to global
efforts to regulate arm transfers.24 And even with the passing of the ATT,
Russia and China have abstained from joining the treaty.25

16
See UN Secretary-General, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common
International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms, A/62/278 (part
II)
(Aug.
17,
2007),
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/463/53/PDF/N0746353.pdf?OpenElement.
17
See Vasilenkov, supra note 4. India abstained from the ATT due to its concern with how the
ATT would handle its current arms contracts. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, UN Treaty is First Aimed
at Regulating Global Arms Sales, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-atun.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Article 26 of the ATT addresses how the ATT affects other,
already-existing international agreements. See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6.
18
See Arms Trade Treaty, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
19
See American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. International Legal Materials,
52 I.L.M. 985 (Apr. 2, 2013).
20
See id.
21
See Arms Trade Treaty, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/att (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
22
American Society of International Law, supra note 19.
23
See International Arms Transfers, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/05 (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
24
See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, UN Misses Its Deadline for Arms Pact, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
(July 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/world/proponents-of-arms-trade-treaty-urgefinal-approval.html?_r=0.
25
See G.A. Res. 67/234B, UN GAOR, 67th Sess. UN DOC. ATT Voting Chart, (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20130402/ATTVotingChart.pdf.
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While various agreements concerning arms trade existed prior to the
ATT, a need for a more multilateral, collaborative effort was evident.
These agreements were widely considered to be inadequate as they were
quite limited in their scope and reach and more voluntary than
obligatory.27 Furthermore, States were exasperated by the seemingly
nonstop violation of these agreements and UN embargoes.28 Shortly after
the Persian Gulf War in 1991, various non-governmental organizations
began a lobbying campaign to curtail arms transfers. 29 However, a vote
in the General Assembly did not come until more than two decades
later.30
Finally in 2006, Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya, and others,
in an effort to curb this problem, proposed the first-ever multilateral
treaty aimed at regulating the world’s arms trade.31 Member States that
pushed the ATT forward contended that the ATT was needed to prevent
the transfer of arms to those who would destroy peace, commit atrocities,
and weaken the world’s efforts to cut poverty.32
Nonetheless, passing the ATT was not without difficulty, even with
consensus among the vast majority of States to the need of such a
treaty.33 By July 2012, six years after the proposal first came, a draft
treaty was finally proposed. However, some Member States objected to
the draft and sought more time to negotiate the terms of the treaty.34 The
26

See International Arms Transfers, supra note 23.
These agreements were considered inadequate as they were quite limited in their scope and
reach and as they were more voluntary than obligatory.
28
See Louis Charbonneau, UN Arms Embargoes Don’t Work, Arms Treaty Needed: Rights
Groups, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-arms-treaty-unidUSBRE92I1A120130319.
29
The Persian War made clear the problem that Iraq had more arms than France. See
MacFarquhar, supra note 17.
30
See id.
31
Member States that first introduced the arms trade resolution at the UN General Assembly
included Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom. See G.A.
Res. 61/89, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., UN DOC. A/RES/61/89, (Dec. 18, 2006),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/89&Lang=E.
32
See UN Secretary-General, The Arms Trade Treaty: Rep. of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.
A/66/166, (July 20, 2011) (citing views of member states on the need for an Arms Trade Treaty).
33
See Vasilenkov, supra note 4.
34
The United States was a leading force in the objection to the adoption of the 2012 draft. See
Gladstone, supra note 24.
27
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objectors, headed by the United States, suggested that the 2012 draft
inadequately addressed the complex problem of illegal arms trafficking
and that in order to achieve consensus more time and revision was
needed.35 At the time, however, the United States did not provide any
clear specifics as to what exactly needed to be addressed.36 And some
questioned whether the United States had any intent to join and ratify the
ATT, as economic and political pressures might not favor its existence.37
In the first round of 2013 negotiations, the ATT’s main objectors—Iran,
North Korea, and Syria—prevented consensus. 38 During the second
round of negotiations in March 2013, consensus once again seemed
unlikely, but Member States, led by the United States, developed a
circumventing process around the need for consensus,39 requiring only a
majority vote.40
After years of debate, the UN General Assembly finally passed the
ATT on April 2, 2013.41 One hundred and fifty-four Member States
voted in favor of the ATT, with only Iran, North Korea, and Syria voting
in outright opposition.42 Not every Member State voted; Russia abstained
from the vote along with twenty-two other Member States.43 The ATT
was not to come into force until ninety days after the fiftieth Member
State ratified the treaty.44
The treaty has moved forward at an unprecedented rate,45 meeting
the minimum ratification requirement in less than a year and a half.46 The
number of Member States who have ratified the ATT surpassed fifty on
September 25, 2014; the treaty entered into force on December 24,
35

The United States firmly stated that the regulation of arms should be controlled by the
individual states. Press Statement, Victoria Nuland, Department Spokesperson, Arms Trade Treaty
Conference,
Office
of
the
Spokesperson
(July
27,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/195622.htm. From the ATT’s early days in 2006, the
United States had been a consistent and, at oft times, lone objector to the ATT. See Paul Holtom &
Mark Bromley, Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations, SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament
and International Security, available at http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2014/files/sipri-yearbook2014-chapter-10-section-i.
36
See Nuland, supra note 35.
37
See Noah Rayman, The Real News at the UN: U.S. Signs Arms Trade Treaty, TIME (Sept. 26,
2013), http://world.time.com/2013/09/26/the-real-news-at-the-u-n-u-s-signs-arms-trade-treaty/.
38
The Long Journey Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (June 5,
2013), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/the-long-journey-towards-an-arms-trade-treaty.
39
See G.A. Res. 67/234A, UN GAOR 67th Sess. UN Doc. A/RES/67/234 (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/234.
40
The Long Journey Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 38.
41
See G.A. Res. 67/234B, supra note 25.
42
Iran, North Korea, and Syria voted “No” in opposition of the ATT. See id.
43
Abstaining nations include Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt,
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, LAO PDR, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, and Yemen. See id.
44
See United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 22. The specific procedures for
ratifying a treaty may be different in every State, but typically ratification is the legislative process
authorizing the treaty.
45
Optimistic projections for when the ATT would enter into force hover around three years.
See Paul Hotom & Mark Bromley, Next Steps for the Arms Trade Treaty: Securing Early Entry Into
CONTROL
ASSOCIATION
(June
3,
2013),
Force,
ARMS
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_06/Next-Steps-for-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty_Securing-EarlyEntry-Into-Force.
46
See Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 18.
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2014.47 However, only time can truly tell what effect the ATT will have
on the transfer of the conventional arms, which kill someone every
minute.48
III. RUSSIA’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABSTENTION
AND THEIR VALIDITY
While having expressed support for the idea of a multi-lateral arms
trade treaty, Russia does not have any clear intention of signing the ATT.
Although, it is possible that Russia may decide to join the treaty at some
point down the road. 49 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Alexeevich
Ryabkov 50 stated at the Russia Arms Expo 2013, “Our decision on
whether we should join this treaty has not yet been taken. It will be taken
later, with consideration of many factors not excluding the speed of the
treaty’s ratification by countries that had already signed it.”51
At the time of adoption in 2013, Russia abstained from signing the
agreement in order to perform a more careful analysis.52 Even the UN
Secretary General recognized that “sales of conventional weapons was
an important and complex sector, affecting the financial interests of the
countries, their national security and foreign policy on the one hand, and
directly relating to humanitarian and legal aspects of international law on
the other.”53
After studying the ATT more carefully, Russia had several
objections to the ATT and concluded that it “lacked substance.”54 While
the ATT’s proponents believe that it will help stop the transfer of arms to
terrorists,55 “Russia is more skeptical.”56
Russia has raised several justifications for its abstention from the
ATT.57 Among those justifications are the following: a) the ATT is not
legally binding; b) the ATT does not address transfers to private actors;
47

See id.
See Shah, supra note 5.
49
The Russian envoy to the UN, Vitaly I. Churkin, noted that Russia is concerned “about what
he called ambiguities in the treaty, including how terms like genocide would be defined, had pushed
his government to abstain.” But Russia did not completely reject the ATT altogether. See
MacFarquhar, supra note 17.
50
Mr. Ryabkov has been the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation since 2008.
See Sergey Alexeevich Ryabkov, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA,
http://www.mid.ru/bul_ns_en.nsf/kartaflat/en03.02.04 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
51
Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra note 14.
52
Igor Siletsky, Moscow Not to Sign Arms Trade Treaty that Discriminates Against Russian
VOICE
OF
RUSSIA
(May
20,
2014),
Military-Industrial
Sector,
THE
http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_20/Moscow-not-to-sign-Arms-Trade-Treaty-thatdiscriminates-against-Russian-military-industrial-sector-9345/.
53
Vasilenkov, supra note 4.
54
Siletsky, supra note 52.
55
Secretary of State, John Kerry, stated, “It will help reduce the risk that international transfers
of conventional arms will be used to carry out the world’s worst crimes, including terrorism,
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” MacFarquhar, supra note 17.
56
See Associated Press, U.S. to Sign New Arms Trade Treaty, Russia Undecided, THE
MOSCOW TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-to-sign-newarms-trade-treaty-russia-undecided/481080.html.
57
See Siletsky, supra note 52; Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra
note 14.
48
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c) the ATT’s standards are too low; and d) the ATT discriminates against
Russia.58
Even though more than the requisite fifty States quickly ratified the
ATT, Russia will likely not become party to the treaty. Political pressure
may mount against Russia to join the treaty, but Russian history has
shown time and again that Russia is not afraid to stand on its own.
Russia’s justifications for abstention are motivated in part by valid
concerns and in part by political posturing.
A. Legally Binding
While Russia claims that the ATT is not legally binding, the ATT is
as legally binding as any multi-lateral treaty. However, Russia’s concern
is not completely without merit, it is only misstated. Russia’s real
concern is that much of the ATT’s text is recommendatory rather than
obligatory. Even so, the ATT will likely have an effect on customary
international law in establishing state practice.
1. Russia: ATT Is Not Legally Binding
Russian representatives have expressed concerns that the ATT is not
legally binding.59 Having studied the ATT more fully, Vadim Kozyulin,
professor at the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow,60 stated that
while the ATT was intended to create “rules of civilized weapons
trading,” it does not require those rules.61 He added that the rules are
more recommendatory than obligatory and “the contract does not provide
penalties for its violation.” 62 Article 14, the ATT’s enforcement
provision, provides only that “Each State Party shall take appropriate
measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the
provisions of this Treaty.”63 Kozyulin concluded, “Since the agreement is
not legally binding, we do not want to join it.” 64
2. The ATT Is Actually Legally Binding but Lacks Teeth
Russia’s concern that the ATT is not legally binding is misguided.
The ATT is legally binding. The ATT “is a multilateral, legally-binding
agreement that establishes common standards for the international trade

58
See Siletsky, supra note 52 (justifying Russia’s abstention by contending that the ATT is not
legally binding, does not address transfers to non-state actors, and is discriminatory against Russia);
Arms Trade Treaty Standards Too Low to Join – Moscow, supra note 14 (justifying Russia’s
abstentions by alleging that the ATT’s standards are lower than Russia’s standards).
59
See id.
60
See Expert, PIR CENTER, http://www.pircenter.org/en/experts/19-kozyulin-vadim-b (last
visited Oct. 7, 2014).
61
Siletsky, supra note 52.
62
Id.
63
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 6, Art. 14.
64
Siletsky, supra note 52.
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of conventional weapons.”65 Therefore, Russia’s contention is misstated.
It may be better stated that the ATT’s text is more recommendatory
rather than obligatory, but all of a treaty’s provisions need not be
obligatory for the treaty to be legally binding.
While the ATT is binding on the Member-State parties, it lacks any
real bite. The ATT’s text binds the Member-State parties to very little,
leaving much of the treaty as suggestive or recommendatory. Russia’s
justification that the ATT is more recommendatory in nature than
binding is not completely without grounds, and Russia is not alone in this
assertion. Even some supporters of the ATT have admitted that it is not
obligatory, stating that it “will be used . . . [more] as political and moral
guidelines.”66 Such a contention is supported by the text of the ATT.
Although the treaty requires some form of ratification (making the
treaty part of a state’s domestic law),67 much of the ATT’s text suggests
possible courses of action rather than requiring much of anything.
Articles 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 repeatedly use “encouraged” instead
of “shall”. Even when “shall” is occasionally used, it is typically
discounted by qualifying language. Several specific examples from the
text of the ATT may illustrate this plainly.
First, in connection with the ATT’s attempt to regulate the diversion
of arms, Article 11 does not require that the exporting or importing party
report or share information with other States. 68 Article 11 provides:
“States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one
another.”69 Additionally, “States Parties are encouraged to report to other
States Parties . . . on measures taken.” 70 If states are to be held
accountable for the diversion of arms, then the ATT must require, not
merely encourage, the reporting and sharing of relevant information. As
it is written, Member States can choose if and when to provide any
information. That is not binding.
Next, Article 15’s International Cooperation provision is almost
entirely recommendatory. 71 While this provision begins with the
requirement that “States Parties shall cooperate,” the rest of the provision
fails to require much of any real cooperation. 72 “States Parties are
encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, . . . States Parties are
encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share
information, as appropriate, . . . States Parties are encouraged to
cooperate, . . . etc.”73 “Shall” is used one other time in this provision, but
65
The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (July 19, 2013),
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty.
66
MacFarquhar, supra note 17.
67
Article 14 requires that “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national
laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.” See United Nations Arms Trade
Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 14, 21–22.
68
Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added).
69
Id. (emphasis added).
70
Id. (emphasis added).
71
See id. at art. 15.
72
Id. (emphasis added).
73
Id. (emphasis added).
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is quickly discounted by the qualifier, “where jointly agreed.”74 So, even
though the ATT may initially appear to require international cooperation
it then makes any type of cooperation something “encouraged” or subject
to agreement between the nations.
Further, Article 16 establishes a trust fund for international
assistance but fails to require any State Parties to contribute to the fund.
It begins, “A voluntary trust fund shall be established,” but later
concludes, “Each State Party is encouraged to contribute to the fund.”75
This provision is yet another example of how the ATT fails to require
much of anything.
Lastly, while Article 12 of the ATT seems to require each party to
“maintain national records . . . of its issuance of export authorizations or
its actual exports,” it does not require any specific information to be
included in the reports.76 The ATT, once again, does not require that
certain information be included but only makes several suggestions as to
what may be included in the records.77
While the ATT is technically binding on the Member-State parties, it
lacks any real teeth. The ATT’s text binds the Member-State parties to
very little, while leaving much of the treaty as suggestive or
recommendatory. Russia may be justified in its reticence to join the
ATT as it actually requires very little of the parties. However, such a
treaty may help to establish state practice when determining customary
international law.78 To say that the ATT is not legally binding is false,
and even the recommendatory portions will likely play an important role
in creating legally binding obligations concerning the transfer of
conventional arms.
B. Arms Transfers to Non-State Actors
Russia’s concern that the ATT does not specifically address arms
transfers to non-state actors is a valid concern. Such transfers are not
expressly addressed in the ATT and likely result in the furtherance of
the very types of human suffering and instability that the ATT is
intended to prevent.
1. Russia: ATT Does Not Address Arms Transfers to Non-state Actors
Russia is deeply concerned that arms transfers to non-state actors are
not within the scope of the ATT. On a number of occasions, Russia
claims to have made efforts to add language to the ATT that would
74

Id.
Id. at art. 16.
Id. at art. 12.
77
“Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type.”
75
76

Id.

78
“Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established state
practice, as opposed to obligations arising from [treaties].” Customary International law, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LAW
SCHOOL:
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
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include “non-state actors” into the scope of the treaty.79 These efforts
proved unsuccessful, as they were not fully considered by the General
Assembly.80 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov noted that the
proponents’ refusal to regulate the transfer of arms to non-state actors is
one of Russia’s main objections to signing the ATT.81
2. The ATT Does Not Specifically Address Arms Transfers to Non-state
Actors
Russia’s concern that the ATT does not specifically address arms
transfers to non-state actors is valid. Russia was not alone in recognizing
the ATT’s failure to address arms transfers to non-state actors.82 The
ATT fails to expressly prohibit or even address transfers to non-state
actors.83
The ATT’s text appears to only consider transfers to other States,
and does not mention other non-state actors. 84 For example, in
considering whether or not the export is “prohibited,” Article 7, section 1
requires that the “exporting State Party” take into account “information
provided by the importing State.”85 Article 8 only addresses transfers to
State Parties.86 A major drawback to the ATT is that these export and
import provisions do not account for the possibility of exporting the arms
to a non-state actor.
Russia is not alone in its concern with the ATT’s failure to prohibit
transfers to non-state actors.87 For example, in 2011, China commented,
“The arms trade should be strictly limited to transactions between
Sovereign States and transfers of arms to non-state actors should be
prohibited, so as to effectively combat and curb illegal trafficking and
misuse of weapons.”88 In 2012, the Ivory Coast urged that “the transfer
of arms to non-state actors should be specifically banned by an ATT.”89
However, the ATT’s proponents have asserted that it is necessary to
allow arms transfers to “liberation movements facing abusive
governments.” 90 That assertion is problematic for many reasons. First,
there are several questions. Perhaps transferring arms to non-state actors
79
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attempting to overthrow their government does not further the goal of the
ATT? What does “abusive governments” mean? Does it mean a
government that is not in favor with western countries, or does it have
another possible meaning? Second, Russia has not said that the ATT
must prohibit any and all arms transfers to non-state actors, but only that
the ATT’s failure to address the issue is a major omission.
Russia is justified in its concern over the ATT’s failure to address
arms transfers to non-state actors. Leaving out non-state actors entirely is
problematic. There are many instances of arms transfers to non-state
actors in the countries of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, and
Yemen.91 Non-state actors in countries such as these frequently commit
atrocities.92 In the first eight months of 2014, the self-proclaimed Islamic
State, a non-state actor, killed or seriously injured over 24,000 civilians
in Iraq.93 For these reasons, transfers to non-state actors cut against the
ATT’s purpose.
While the ATT restricts transfers to legitimate governments who are
deemed unfit for transfers, it fails to address the problems of those who
fight in opposition to their government.94 Russian media reported that
Russia’s interest in including private parties within the scope of the ATT
“stems from a desire to protect the existing legitimate government
authorities from attempts of a military mutiny . . . which has already
taken place in Libya and Syria.”95 Some non-state actors of concern may
include groups such as terrorist organizations, private military
companies, political parties, civilian militias, paramilitary groups, and
arms traffickers. One factor that may have played a role in failing to
address non-state actors in the ATT is that precisely defining non-state
actors is difficult. Other factors might include the finite time for
consensus and individual national interests in opposition of MemberStates.
C. ATT’s Standards
While it is valid that the low standards included in the ATT would
not effectively achieve its purpose, this justification is likely a ploy by
Russia. Russia’s real concern is that the ATT would prohibit many of its
current arms transfers. Thus, it is unlikely that Russia’s claim, that the
ATT’s standards are in fact lower than Russia’s standards, is valid.
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1. Russia: ATT’s Standards Are Too Low
Russia claims that the ATT’s standards are not strict enough.96 From
the beginning, Russia called for stricter “regulations on the re-export of
weapons.” 97 This proved unsuccessful. Deputy Foreign Minister
Ryabkov explained Russia’s abstention by stating that the ATT’s
standards are “inferior” to Russia’s own standards.98 Russia claims that
their arms transfers “are under strict control.” 99 Countries that import
Russia’s arms are required to provide a certificate, which allegedly
guarantees that the arms will not be sent or supplied to third-party
countries.100
The ATT has other shortcomings. Even supporters have admitted
that the ATT has “significant loopholes.”101 As mentioned above, the
ATT’s focus is on arms sales to other State parties and not on transfers to
non-state actors. Additionally, the ATT leaves open other “ways in
which conventional arms are transferred including as gifts, loans, leases,
and aid.”102
2. The ATT’s Standards Are Likely Not Lower than Russia’s
Russia’s justification that the ATT’s standards are too low is likely
an attempt to conceal another, more probable motive: to avoid being
subject to the arms regulations. While Russia alleges that its own
standards are higher than the ATT’s standards, the fact that the country
transfers arms to Syria and other nations may indicate otherwise.
Many Russian arms transfers to Syria would be prohibited under the
ATT. Over the past few years alone, the Syrian government has directly
attacked its civilian population.103 Attacks against civilian populations
are prohibited under the ATT.104 Article 6 of the ATT prohibits transfers
to States that attack their civilian populations if the exporting State has
knowledge at the time of the arms transfer authorization that the arms
will be used in committing prohibited acts and atrocities.105 Under the
ATT, any arms transfers from Russia to Assad ruled Syria would not be
allowed because of Russia’s knowledge that the arms will be used in a
way prohibited by the ATT.
Russia’s justification that the ATT’s standards are too low is not
valid. Article 7 provides that the export assessment should be done
96
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“pursuant to [the Exporting State’s] national control system.” 106 So
Russia can claim that its standards are higher than the ATT’s standards,
but the ATT does not prohibit Russia from using their “higher”
standards. In fact, the ATT even requires States to incorporate their own
national standards, disarming Russia’s original claim.
D. Discriminatory Effect
The concern that the ATT may discriminate against Russian
interests is valid. The ATT may, in fact, prohibit more Russian arms
transfers than American or other western States’ transfers should Russia
become a party to the ATT.
1. Russia: ATT Discriminates Against Russian Interests
Russia claims that the ATT, as drafted, discriminates against Russian
interests. Believing that the implications of the ATT had not been fully
considered, Russia expressed concern that the treaty would discriminate
against “the Russian military-industrial complex.”107 In an effort to avoid
the negative implications of such a treaty, Russia did not become a party
to the ATT.108 Rather, Russia will continue to supply arms according to
“its own ideas about who, where and why it is selling these weapons.”109
According to Kozyulin, “The [ATT] has a number of points that can be
considered discriminating against [Russia].”110
The foremost concern revolves around the likely negative impact on
Russia’s military-industrial sector. 111 Joining the treaty would affect
Russia’s “ability to supply arms to individual States, which the US and
the West can equate to ‘terrorist regimes.’”112 Russia believes that the
ATT is drafted to prohibit more Russian arms transfers than American or
other western States’ transfers.113
Another of Russia’s concerns is with the potentially discriminatory
effect of the amendment provision of the ATT.114 Article 20 of the ATT
provides the option, according to some experts, of making amendments
that may be even harsher on Russia, depriving “some Russian producers
from certain arms markets . . . [a]nd . . . limit[ing] the supply of arms into
Russia.”115
Russia did not end the ATT talks because it was optimistic that its
concerns would be taken more seriously.116 However, until the above
106
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mentioned concerns are more adequately addressed, Russia feels “the
entire story of the contract looks more like another attempt to ‘put
pressure’ on Russia and displace it from its traditional markets.” 117
Russia sees the ATT as an example of the West’s efforts to “use
international treaties as a political lever to limit Russian military
exports.”118
2. The ATT May Discriminate Against Russian Interests in Its Effect but
Not on Its Face
The justification that the ATT discriminates against Russia, if indeed
true, is a valid concern for Russia. Russia has not claimed that the ATT,
on its face, expressly discriminates against Russia, but rather that the
result of the ATT is discriminatory.119
First, if Russia were a party to the ATT, a significant curb in arms
sales would likely result, seriously damaging Russia’s military-industrial
sector.120 As reported by Russian news outlets, at least half of Russia’s
arms transfers go to nations, such as Syria, Venezuela, and China, which
have been deemed “unreliable or criminal” due to previous behavior.121
If half of Russia’s arms transfers go to States that would likely be
prohibited under the ATT, then serious damage to Russia’s arms trade
business would result from joining the ATT. The ATT may actually
affect more Russian arms transfers than American arms transfers. That
result would not only be discriminatory in relative terms, but it would
have a large impact in absolute economic terms. After all, Russia is the
second largest arms supplier in the world.122
Additionally, the fact that the United States signed and ratified the
ATT and that Russia abstained from signing the treaty may indicate that
the treaty is more favorable to American interests than to Russian
interests. With the help of its allies, the United States has a history of
promoting favorable UN resolutions that effectively create sales markets
for its businesses.123 Strong American and European business interests
drive a lot of political action. 124 The United States and some other
western States joined the ATT after opposing it for a number of years.
That delay may suggest that the United States and the other western
States only joined after crafting the treaty to better favor their national
interests.125
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Russia is not alone in thinking that the ATT may be discriminatory.
Other States, such as Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, have expressed
concern that the ATT “might be abused to create political pressure.”126
Even American media outlets recognize the “hope” of the ATT’s
proponents that some otherwise “reluctant to ratify” nations “will feel
public pressure.”127 The United States and its allies in favor of American
interests at the expense of other nations’ interests would likely wield this
abuse of public pressure. Throughout history large, powerful western
nations have used their political and economic power to advance their
own national interests over the interests of weaker nations.128 The ATT
might be yet another tool to create pressure on countries to behave in a
way that advances western interests over other nations’ own interests.
Lastly, Russia’s concern with future amendments to the ATT
possibly being discriminatory against Russia has no more basis than it
has with any other multi-lateral treaty. This concern may be present with
all treaties that are subject to future amendments. Yes, Article 20 of the
ATT provides for future amendments to the ATT; however, Article 24
provides for the ability of any party to withdraw from the treaty.129 In the
future, States will likely propose amendments that will better protect
their own national interests. Such proposals may hurt other States’
interests. It is up to each State to protect its own interests. Russia can
vote for or against amendments, propose their own amendments, or
withdraw completely from the ATT, just like any other nation.
Russia may be justified in its concern over the ATT’s possible
discriminatory effects. The ATT may treat western States more favorably
than Russia. Naturally, a State is not inclined to join a treaty that may
unfairly value other States’ interests over its own. For this reason, Russia
and other States may have reason to be skeptical of the ATT and its
potential discriminatory effect on some countries and its favorable
treatment towards others.130
It is possible that hurting Russia’s arms trade business is necessary to
achieve the ATT’s purpose. Some have admitted that “making it harder
for Russia to argue that its arms deals with Syria are legal under
international law” will help to achieve the ATT’s goal of curbing arms
sales “that kill tens of thousands of people every year.”131 Clearly, if the
purpose of the ATT is to curb Russia’s arms transfers, then it is
discriminatory. However, on its face, the purpose of the ATT is not to
curb Russian transfers, but it is to contribute to “peace, security, and
stability,” to reduce “human suffering,” and to promote “cooperation,
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transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international
trade in conventional arms.”132
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ATT IN APPLICATION
Though there may be reason to question the ATT’s potential
effectiveness in its application, the ATT may still be a step in the right
direction. Several things, however, cut against the ATT’s likely success
in fully achieving its goal to curb arms being used in the commission of
genocides and other atrocities. First, Russia and other key states, such as
China, are not parties to the treaty. Second, the treaty’s text has large
gaps, such as its failure to address the transfer of arms to non-state
actors. Lastly, interests of individual Member State parties will subjugate
the ATT’s goals.
First, many States, including Russia, either rejected the ATT or
abstained from joining it.133 Additionally, the majority of the States who
are signatories to the ATT have not yet ratified it and may avoid ratifying
the treaty altogether.134 Just as various countries thought it unwise to
join the treaty when the largest producer and seller of weapons was
rejecting the treaty, 135 it may be unwise to think the treaty will be
effective when the second largest producer and seller is not party to the
treaty. The more countries that do not feel compelled to abide by the
ATT—either because they are not party to the treaty or because they do
not feel obligated—will equate to more arms transfers occurring outside
the confines of the ATT. Nic Marsh of the Peace Research Institute
Oslo136 stated, “Having the abstentions from two major arms exporters
lessens the moral weight of the treaty . . . . By abstaining they have left
their options open.”137
Moreover, some of the Member States that most needed to join the
treaty did not. Skeptics contend that the ATT will experience the same
fate as the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which prohibited
“the use, transfer and stockpiling of cluster bombs.”138 In the case of the
CCM, States that had never made cluster bombs readily signed the treaty,
while States that made and possessed cluster bombs did not sign the
treaty. 139 The United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy, and Sweden have all ratified the ATT. However, Russia,
with a quarter of global arms sales, and China, with another five percent
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of global sales, have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.140 Several
major arms importers, including India, Pakistan, South Korea, and
Singapore, have avoided ratifying the treaty as well.141 Further, of the
twenty-three countries that abstained, many have the kind of human
rights records that the ATT is designed to prevent.142
Second, the ATT’s text has large gaps that can leave Member States
to act almost without restriction in some arms transfer areas. For
example, the ATT does not specifically address arms transfers to nonstate actors,143 thereby failing to prevent the transfer of arms to non-state
actors or other illegal transfers which often result in the commission of
atrocities contrary to the ATT’s purpose. Several Member States
expressed concern that the ATT’s omission of non-state actors “deeply
weakened the [ATT] and undermined its effectiveness.”144 Nicaragua’s
delegate expressed concern with this gap, calling it, “dangerous,”
recalling the “tens of thousands of lives” that were lost in his country
during the 1980s due to arms transfers to non-state actors.145
The current situation with the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’
highlights this “gap” in a different light.146 Countries party to the ATT,
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, “have all either supplied or said
they will supply weapons to [non-state actors] . . . fighting the Islamic
State in Syria and Iraq and . . . the Assad regime in Syria.”147
Moreover, these gaps in the text may have been caused in part by the
many competing States’ interests. The “black market” transfers arms
through poorly controlled regions and “under the guise of equipment or
spare parts.”148 These black markets’ successes are due in large part to
weak, compromised agreements.149 The treaty does not properly take
care of arms trafficking or “the illegal trade through third countries,”150
which seriously undermines the ATT’s effectiveness.
Finally, the ATT’s main purpose to “reduce human suffering” will be
subjugated to other State interests and may possibly become so diluted
that it will lose meaning in the arms context. “As long as the world is
divided into the East and the West, ‘democratic’ and ‘dictatorial’
regimes, ‘terrorist Islamists’ and ‘civilized Christians,’ the interests of
140
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national security and commercial secrets will always be more important
than world peace.” 151 Many States’ budgets are largely shaped by
revenue received from arms exports, and these economic and political
interests have incentivized States to violate already existing arms
norms.152
Further, the multilateral nature of the ATT provides for low
standards and recommendatory rather than obligatory language. For
example, many African countries have long supported the ATT and
joined the treaty. These African governments recognized that the ATT’s
text is weaker than they had hoped.153 However, some have hoped that
even though the treaty’s text might be weak, the ATT “would curb the
arms sales that have fueled many conflicts.” 154 But without Russia,
China, and various other influential Member States, the effectiveness of
the ATT remains questionable.
Nevertheless, when all has been said and done, some are still hopeful
that the ATT “will help to reduce armed violence.”155 Anna MacDonald,
Head of Arms Control for Oxfam International,156 stated, “This treaty
won’t solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but
it will help to prevent future Syrias . . . It will help to reduce conflict.” 157
However, MacDonald’s Syrian example is faulty on its face. Claiming
that the ATT will stop “future Syrias” from happening is naïve. How
would it? Russia is the number one supplier of arms to Syria, and Russia
is not party to the ATT.
The ATT will not be as effective in accomplishing its purposes since
Russia and other key States are not party to the treaty, the treaty’s text
contains large gaps, and the treaty’s interests will lose out to the Member
State parties’ national interests. However, that does not mean that the
ATT will fail altogether. Brian Wood, Head of Arms Control and Human
Rights, believes in the ATT. He noted that what makes the ATT so great
is that “for the first time in history – states would have to consider
international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as international
criminal law, as a basis on which to decide whether an arms transfer
across borders should go ahead.”158 Even though the ATT may not be as
strong as many would like, the ATT is still a step in the right direction: a
step toward global cooperation in creating and preserving peace and
security.
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V. CONCLUSION

The ATT’s goal to end the commission of genocides and protect the
hundreds of thousands of civilians who are killed each year is
praiseworthy. The killing that occurs on a daily basis is atrocious and the
global community should come together in an effort to solve this
problem. Some Member States feel that the ATT is a valiant effort at
curbing such violence, but others Member States are skeptical and for
good reason.
Russia has some real reasons to be concerned with and skeptical of
the ATT. First, while the ATT is, in all reality, legally binding, the
ATT’s text appears to be more recommendatory than obligatory. Second,
the ATT fails to address arms transfers to non-state actors. And third, it
may be discriminatory in its effect against Russia. However, Russia’s
justifications are likely, in part, a ploy to allow Russia to transfer arms to
States that would otherwise be precluded under the ATT. Russia claims
that the ATT’s standards are lower than Russia’s standards, but that is
doubtful.
Additionally, the ATT will not be as effective as it could be. Without
Russia joining the treaty, the ATT loses some of its potential
effectiveness. Russia is one of the largest suppliers of arms in the world,
meaning that Russia alone could supply arms to many of the States that
the ATT is intended to prevent from getting arms. Additionally, other
States, including China, have followed suit and avoided becoming party
to the ATT. With so many key exporting and importing States abstaining
or objecting, the ATT will not be able to regulate much of the world
where the need for such regulation exists. Further, as long as the ATT
does not regulate transfers to non-state actors, much of the problem the
treaty was intended to address will be left unaffected by the ATT. Lastly,
even the Member States who are party to the ATT will likely subordinate
the ATT’s goals to their own State’s interests.
Many of the ATT’s shortcomings are likely a result of the process
through which multi-lateral treaties come into being in the UN General
Assembly. The ATT is only one example from the many treaties enacted
by the UN General Assembly. The ATT’s ineffectiveness is not unique
to the ATT—the effectiveness of any treaty that goes through the
General Assembly can be decreased. The Member States, playing
political games, may want to appease political and social pressures but
will almost always act in furtherance of their own State’s interest. For
example, a State may act as if it is in favor of the treaty but might, in
reality, be doing everything it can to weaken the effect of the treaty.
With so many different and often opposing interests, a multi-lateral
treaty will almost never survive the process with any real teeth. Is this the
result we want from the treaty process? And if a treaty is in fact
ineffectual, then does it matter whether a State chooses to abstain from or
join the treaty?
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While weak treaties may not be the best result, a weak treaty can still
be seen as a step forward. Indeed, having low standards is better than
having no standards, and addressing part of the problem is better than
ignoring the problem altogether. The UN General Assembly treaty
process may not be perfect, but it is better than nothing and can suffice
until a better process for creating multi-lateral treaties is implemented.
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